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I. Introduction 
Like ma.ny developing countries, Colanbia has followed a p:>licy of 
concessionaty interest rates for agricultural credit in an attempt to 
pratOte agricultural production and to subsidize fat"TOOrs, especially 
small fanners. Concessionary interest rates lead to an excess demand for 
subsidized agricultural credit, which in turn necessitates rationing 
devices and procedures to allocate this credit. The Colombian government 
has developed elaborate rationing mechanisms in an attenpt to allocate 
specific amounts of bank credit to various crops and there~ to promote 
their production. 'lhe primary purpose of this paper is to examine these 
rationing mechanisms and to evaluate their success in achieving the 
planned allocation of agricultural credit and in promoting the production 
of designated crops. 
In Colanbia two govertlll'ent institutions are responsible for alrrost 
all institutional credit allocated to the agricultural sector. The first 
is the Fondo Financiero Agropecuario (FFAP), a department of the Banco de 
la :Republica (Colanbia's central bank), which rediscounts bank loans to 
the agricultural sector. Resources for these rediscounts are obtained 
primarily fran oonds, which Colanbian banks are required to hold, from 
international lending institutions and at times directly fran the Banco 
de la :Republica. The goverl'l'lren t' s Junta l>'bnetaria establishes the 
conditions for these agricultural loans and rediscounts and, in fact, for 
all formal agricultural credit. The second government institution is the 
Caja .Agraria, founded in the 1930's, which is the largest bank in 
Colombia. Like other banks in Colombia, the Caja Agraria has access to 
rediscounts from FFAP, and it makes substantial use of these resources. 
Hc:Mever, unlike the other banks, the Caja J.\qraria also makes substantial 
use of its CMn resources (obtained primarily fran demand de};X)sits and 
fran t~ and savings dep::>sits) in its agricultural lending. Also, 
unlike other banks and FFAP, the Caja 
*Visiting Professor of .Agrirultural Econanics at The Ohio State 
University on leave from Syracuse University and Associate Professor of 
Agricultural Econanics at The Ohio State University, respectively. We 
wish to thank our colleagues in the 1\qricultural Finance W::lrkshop for 
helpful carm:mts, but they are not res};X)nsible for any remaining errors. 
-2-
Agraria is oriented toward serving small farmers, and the majority of 
Caja credit fran its own ordinary resources is in fact allocated to small 
farmers. In the subsequent analysis, Caja loans based on FFAP 
rediSCOlU1ts are included in FFAP statistics, while Caja statistics 
refer only to loans from the Caja's ordinary resources. 
The next section of this paper examines agrirul tural credit fOlicy in 
Colaobia during the 1970's and in particular the rationing mechanisms 
develcped l:Jy the Colombian government in its attempt to allocate 
agricultural credit to different seasonal crops. Although essentially 
the same nechaniS'TlS are used in allocating credit for permanent crops, 
livestock, infrastructure, agricultural equipment and so forth, the focus 
here is on the major seasonal crq:>s (which can be planted twice per year 
in Colombia): beans, corn, cotton, J:X)tatoes, rice (both irrigated and 
dryland), sesame, sorghum, soybeans and wheat. The main reason for this 
focus is that credit policies can be related more directly to price and 
output in the case of seasonal crcps than for other agricultural 
activities. The third section of the paper examines the Colanbian 
government's agricultural price policies for seasonal crops, especially 
as they relate to the allocation of agricultural credit. The final 
section of the paper ccrrpares the planned and actual allocation of 
agricultural credit and indicates why there is so little relation between 
the credit pro;Jram and actual credit use. Solre conclusions are also 
drawn about the relationship between agricultural credit and production 
and abcut the success of credit }X)licies in praroting the production of 
certain crops and in subsidizing farmers. 
II. Agricultural Credit Policy 
In Colombia during the 1970's real rates of interest on rrost bank 
loans to the agricultural sector have been very lew or even negative. 
Since 1972 the rate of inflation, rreasured l:Jy either the wholesale or 
consumer price index, has averaged rrore than 20 percent per year, at 
tiioos reaching 40 percent. CXl the other hand, nominal interest rates, 
which are set by the Junta r-t:>netaria, have generally ranged between 10 
and 20 percent per year for bank loans to the agricultural sector. M::>re 
specifically, naninal interest rates on short-term loans for seasonal 
crops from the Caja 's ordinary resources have ranged fran 10 to 18 
percent, and fran 10 to 17 percent on loans rediscounted by FFAP (or the 
Fbndo Financiero Agrario before 1973). The resulting low or negative 
real rates of interest suggest that there shoold be substantial excess 
demand for this agricultural credit, especially since borrowers have at 
times been able to earn up to 26 percent '(naninal) interest on certain 
classes of time dep::>sits and nore than 30 percent on short-term and 
virtually risk-free securities. 
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In resp::mse to this excess demand for credit, the Colombian 
government has established rationing mechanisms in an attempt to allocate 
credit to activities which are cons ide red particular 1 y desirable. The 
Oficina de Planeacion del Sector Agropecuario (OPSA) of the Ministerio de 
Agricultura has primary resp:msibility for planning the amounts to be 
lent for different agricultural activities, especially under FFAP 
rediscoonts. 'IWice each year in advance of the planting season, OPSA 
develops its credit programs for seasonal crops (once each year for 
permanent crops and other agricultural activities). In developing these 
credit programs OPSA relies heavily on regional and national canmi ttees 
which are carposed of representatives of government institutions 
concerned with the agricultural sector, financial institutions, producer 
groups and sometimes user groups or other interested individuals. 
Based on perceptions of national requirements and infonnation on crop 
yields, these ccmnittees recanrrend the areas to be planted to different 
crops. 'Ihen, based on estimates of production costs per hectare for each 
crop, reccm:rendations are fornulated for the anount of credit to be 
allocated to each crop. Ibwever, not all production costs are financed. 
land rent and aCXIUisition and SOITV:! laoor costs are ineligible, and not 
all of the eligible costs are financed. For each production pericX! the 
percentage of eligible costs to be financed is set, and these percentages 
vary ooth over time and arrong crops, presumably to provide different 
incentives for the production of different crops. Because of differences 
among areas and technologies, there can be considerable variation in the 
estimates of production costs. Just as it is in the interest of producer 
groups to have high support prices, it is also in their interest to have 
production costs and percentages to be financed set as high as possible, 
in order to obtain more credit at concessionary rates of interest. 
'Ihe reccrnrrendations of the regional canmittees are reviewed by OPSA 
in conjunction with national committees for each of the major crops and 
then submitted to the Junta r-t:>netaria for approval. In determining the 
final version of the agricultural credit program, and in particular the 
amounts to be lent under FFAP rediscounts, the Junta IVbnetaria takes into 
account not only the OPSA recommendations but also overall economic and 
financial considerations such as the rate of inflation, recent patterns 
of growth in money and credit and resources available to FFAP from loan 
repayroonts and new foreign loans. Although the Junta IVk:>netaria may change 
the total amount of credit programmed for the agricultural sector based 
on these considerations, the priorities established by OPSA within the 
agricultural sector are rarely changed, in part because FFAP officials 
are in close contact with OPSA and the regional and national committees 
throughout the planning process. 
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When using FFAP rediscounts the Caja Agraria is subject to the FFAP 
credit program, but when lending fran its ordinary resources the Caja 
Agraria folloos its a.m credit program. HcMever, Caja programming 
closely parallels OPSA programming in two respects: (l) Caja officials 
participate in most of the regional and national committees, and (2) in 
its planning the Caja Agraria relies heavily on information provided by 
its regional offices. 'Ihus, differences between the Caja and FFAP credit 
programs do not result from differences in approach or information, but 
rather from Caja's basic objective of serving small farrrers. Since 
small farmers tend to grow traditional crops, the Caja's credit programs 
enphasize traditional crops such as beans, corn, p::>tatoes, sesame and 
wheat, while FFAP focuses on cc:mtercial crops grown by large farmers such 
as cotton, rice, sorghum and soybeans. In addition, it is argued that 
even for the same crop production costs per hectare are lower for small 
fanners using traditional technologies than for large farmers who rely 
rore heavily on purchased inputs. 'Ihis is said to explain why the Caja 
Agraria establishes higher percentages of production costs to be financed 
but for rost crops actually lends less per hectare than is lent under 
FFAP rediscounts. 
III. Agricultural Price Policy 
In attempting to influence the level and composition of agricultural 
output and to subsidize certain producer groups, the Colanbian governrrent 
uses price t:olicies as ~11 as credit ,P:)licies. The Institute de 
Mercadeo .Agropecuario (IDEMA) is the main gover~ntal institution 
resp:msible for implem?nting price support and stabilization policies. 
IDEl-iA 's primary functions are to buy agricultural products at support 
prices, accumulate buffer stocks, stabilize prices, and ~rt or export 
products as required. 'Ihe price supports apply only to some basic 
products such as rice, corn, beans, sorghum, soybeans, wheat and sesame, 
but IDEMA also buys a few other agricultural products. 
'Ibe influence of support prices on fat'J'OOrs' production decisions 
depends basically on: (1) the level of the support price, (2) the degree 
of fa:nrer confidence in the declared price, and ( 3) farrrers' ability to 
sell at the supp::>rt price. 'Ihe supp:irt price is supp:>sed to cover all 
production costs plus a reasonable profit margin for the average 
pro::iucer. lbwever, for the reasons previously trentioned, the estimates 
of production costs which are developed in the credit planning process 
may be quite subjective and not representative for a significant nunber 
of producers. fureover, except for rice and wheat, supp:>rt prices during 
the 1970's have generally been set at levels belCJ.N the prices actually 
received by farmers, and these low support prices are reflected in IDEMA 
purchases averaging less than 5 percent of annual production for products 
other than rice and wheat. 'Ihese low percentages purchased by IDEMA have 
even failed to reduce seasonal price fluctuations. The financial 
-5-
problems of I DE11A resulting frcrn large operating losses have 1 :i.mi ted 
purchases and encouraged low support prices and may also have 
contrib.Jted to a lack of far1'1"1er confidence in the price support program. 
Farmers are also frequently unable to sell their products at the 
supp:Jrt price because the small number of purchase points ( 41 permanent 
locations plus 50 mobile units) restricts farrrer access and because 
IDEMA's quality specifications often result in substantial discounts for 
products which do not rreet IDEMA's inflexible standards. 'The delay il" 
IDEMA's payrrents may present a further difficulty. It has been reported 
that payments by IDEMA to farmers have sometbnes been delayed for several 
ITOnths in contrast to the immediate cash payrrents offered by private 
buyers. 
Political pressures in urban areas to maintain ad~juate domestic food 
supplies at prices favorable to consll!Ters rray often result in 
agricultural policies that depress farm prices. .<\l though not currently 
used in Colombia on a significant number of agJ:"icultural products, 
contorls over retail food prices and marketing margins have been widely 
applied in the past. Such market intervention policies reduce profits 
and create incentives for producers to divert resources into nonfood or 
nonagricultural production where rates of return are higher. Because of 
the worldwide price increases for many primary commo0ities that occurred 
during the early 1970's, real gross inc<::~re per hectare has tended to 
increase for nost of the products included in this study. Moreover, 
Colombian producers are receiving prices for these products which appear 
to be quite close to international F.O.B. prices when the corrparison is 
made at the official exchange rate. However, when the official exchange 
rate is adjusted for the overvaluation irrplicit in the structure of 
protection, Colombian farmers are likely to be receiving prices which are 
well belcw the international prices for these products. Studies by 
Belassa and associates estimate that in Brazil and Qlile the 
overvaluation was 27 percent and 68 percent, respectively, in the 
mid-1960's, and the structure of protection in these countries is not 
likely to be appreciably different from that of Colowhia. 
IV. The Allocation of Agricultural Credit: Results and Conclusions 
'Ib evaluate the success of Colanbian government rationing mechanisms 
in determining the allocation of agricultural credit, the amo(mt of 
credit prograrrtliEd by FFAP and the Caja Agraria for each of the main 
seasonal crops has been compared with the amount of loans actually 
approved during each Colcmbian agricultural year ,July 1971--June 1972 
through July 1976--June 1977. Table 1 presents the ranges in the ratio 
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Table 1. Relat1on of Anount of Loans Approved to Amount 
of Credit Programmed, 1971-77 3f 
COtton 
Rice( Irrigated) 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Beans 
COrn 
Potatoes 
Rice(Dcyland) 
Sesame 
Wheat 
Range in Ratio of 
Credit Approved to 
Credit Progranmed 
Fondo 
Financiero 
Agropecuario 
1.29 - 5.15 
1.04 - 2.38 
.96 - 4.94 
.54 - 2.06 
.12 - 2.27 
• 72 - 1.50 
.82 - 1.56 
.86 - 2.88 
.43 - 4.18 
.09 - 1.60 
Caja 
Agraria 
.82 - 2.34 
1.66 - 5.45 
.39 - 1.98 
.64 - 2.39 
.82 - 2.46 
.90 - 2.06 
1.15 - 2.43 
.27 - 1.25 
• 79 - 1.60 
.62 - 1.13 
Correlation of 
Credit Approved 
With Credit Pr<.?gramred 
Fondo 
Financiero Caja 
Agropecuario Agraria 
.56 
.36 
-.06 
-.07 
-.10 
.27 
.82* 
.47 
.01 
-.42 
.01 
.62 
.14 
.04 
-.57 
-.07 
.57 
-.05 
-.01 
-.32 
a/ Deflated to 1970 pr1ces us1ng the wholesale price index for 
agricultural products. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Data Sources: [4,5,6,7j 
of the cnrount of loans approved to the arrount of credit programmed by 
FFAP and the Caja Agraria for each of the seasonal crops during this 
period. All of the ranges are very wide, indicating that there is 
virtually no relation between the anount of credit programrred and the 
anount of loans actually made for any of the seasonal crops. 'Ihe only 
pattern which emerges is that COITil'ercial crcps gra,.m by large farmers 
(e.g., cotton, irrigated rice and sorghum) tend to have the highest 
ratios of loans made to credit prograrrured. Table 1 also presents the 
correlations between the amount of credit progranuned by FFAP and the caja 
Agraria in real terms and the amount of loans approved for each of the 
seasonal crops. 'Ihere is again no apparent relation between credit 
programrred and loans approved. Only one correlation coefficient is 
significant at the 10 percent level, and nost are not significant at even 
the 50 percent level. 
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The major conclusion of this paper is that the credit programs of 
FFAP and the Caja Agrar:ia have virtually no inpa.ct on the actual 
allocation of credit among different seasonal crops. Whether or not this 
is undesirable remains to be discussed, but it is worthwhile first to ask 
what factors (other than the credit program) may influence the actual 
allocation. Price and profit expectations, as discussed in the preceding 
section, should be significant factors if the allocation of credit is 
primarily determined by producer demand. Because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the estimates of pt-oduction costs, the follc:wing analysis 
focuses mainly on prices rather than on profit expectations. When IDEHZI. 
support prices for the concurrent period were used to explain the 
allocation of credit, no significant relation could be found. However 
for the reasons indicated in the preceding section, IDEMA prices may have 
little influence on producer behavior. Average prices paid to the 
producers of each crop have thus been used as an alternative explanatorJ 
variable, but with a lead of six months {e.g., prices for calendar year 
1971 related to credit for agricultural year 1971-72). In this case 
prices tend to have the expected p:>sitive irrpact on credit actually 
allocated to the different seasonal crops. When the analysis is 
conducted using a profit variable based on estimates of production costs, 
yields and prices, the results also shew a positive effect on credit 
allocation. 
Because agricultural credit is made available to producers at 
concessionary rates of interest, the amount of financing which can be 
obtained per hectare is another factor which might influence the demand 
for credit. '!here is some evidence that the arrount of credit available 
per hectare for the different seasonal crops has a positive influence on 
the ratio of the amount of loans approved to the amount of credit 
prograrrmed. HCJifllever, real production costs per hectare have a rore 
significant positive :impact on this ratio. Although higher production 
costs should have an adverse effect on profitability, other things being 
equal, it has previously been suggested that the production cost 
estimates used in credit programming may not reflect actual production 
costs, but rather the p::Mer of producer groups to influence cost 
estimates and thereby increase the curount of subsidized credit available 
to then. 
IJanding agencies (i.e., the banks and the Caja Agraria) as well as 
credit users are likely to infJ uence the allocation of credit. For 
example, the percentage of prod1,1ction costs which can be financed is an 
ex-ante variable set as part of the credit program, but the a!TK)unt 
actually lent per hectare is an ex-post variable and depends in part on 
decisions made by the lender. In particular, the Caja Agraria generally 
sets higher percentages in its prograrnwjng than FFAP, but actually lends 
less per hectare. As previously indicated, this anomaly has sometirres 
been explained by arguing that small farmers have lower production costs 
than large farrrers. However, it may be that small farmers are lent 
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less per hectare because lenders perceive them to be nigher risk 
borrowers. Thus, factors affecting lender behavior are likely to play a 
significant role in the divergence of amounts actually lent from the 
credit program and present an important area for further research. 
The main justification for credit programming is to stimulate the 
production of designated crops. However, even if credit allocation 
actually followed the credit program, evidence suggests that in Colombia 
the amounts lent for different seasonal crops are not closely related to 
the area planted or the production of these crops. rvbreover, the major 
conclusion of this paper is that the FFAP and Caja credit programs are 
largely unrelated to the amounts actually lent for the different seasonal 
crops. This may not be an undesirable cutcare if credit is actually 
allocated where rates of return are highest rather than according to the 
preferences of Colombian policymakers. The danger exists that attempts 
will be made to conpel the allocation of credit to follow the credit 
program, even when the program is at variance with borro.ver and lender 
asses~nts of profitability. Because credit is fungible and borrowers 
and lenders can easily report using credit for the activities preferred 
by p:>licymakers, it 'WOuld be costly if not impossible to police 
effectively the allocation of credit. 
Credit programming in Colombia not only fails to ~rove the 
allocation of credit but may also have various undesirable side effects. 
Scarce human resources are largely wasted in the credit planning 
pro-cess, although some benefits may arise from the exchange of 
information which is useful for other agricultural policies (e.g., price 
supports). Another undesirable side effect is the introduction of 
rigidities into the allocation of credit, as only the main crops are 
included in the credit program and new areas and technologies are rarely 
considered. Credit programming also tends to bring about a greater 
concentration of agricultural credit in large loans to large fanrers, 
thereby making the distribution of income more unequal, especially since 
this credit is made available at concessionary rates of interest. As 
long as the policy of concessionary interest rates continues to provide 
substantial subsidies, these recipients of agricultural credit will press 
for the continuation of current policy. Since policies of concessionary 
interest rates and credit programming appear to be widespread in 
developing countries, it should also be worthwhile to investigate if the 
same problems exist in these other countries. 
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